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According to Brunnermeier (2008) “Bubbles are associated with dramatic asset price increases 
followed by a collapse. Bubbles arise if the price exceeds the asset’s fundamental value. This 
can occur, if investors hold the asset because they believe that they can sell it at a higher price 
[to] some investor even though the asset’s price exceeds its fundamental value.” (New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics 2008). This definition comprises three dimensions often found in 
existing descriptions of asset price bubbles: The asset trades above its fundamental value, 
investors might act speculatively, a strong price increase and a bust. 
Studying house price bubbles is important for several reasons. First, asset price bubbles 
generate wealth effects leading to higher consumption during the boom and lower consumption 
during the bust phase. This behaviour stems from the permanent income hypothesis, relating 
current consumption stronger to the discounted value of expected income than to current 
income because households prefer a smooth consumption pattern (Friedmann, 1957). The 
discounted value of expected income does strongly depend on changes in wealth and through 
this channel, changes of asset prices translate into the macroeconomy. Changes in wealth can 
account for much of the observed consumption fluctuations, (Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek, 
2011). Wealth effects from changes in house prices might be particularly important because 
housing accounts for much of the households’ investment portfolio (Englund et al., 2002). 
Changes in housing wealth can translate into higher consumption than a similar increase in 
financial wealth (Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek, 2011). 
Second, asset price bubbles might be associated with a substantial increase in borrowing for 
capital accumulation due to the positive expectations generated by high asset prices. Further, 
as assets can serve as collateral, rising asset prices during a bubble can lead to an increase of 
debt, creating a link to the banking sector. Banks’ balance sheets look safe as long as asset 
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prices are high and back up the accumulated debt until the bust. Banks might react with tighter 
credit conditions, leading to a credit crunch that impacts economic activity (Bean, 2004).  
Third, the fact, that the supply of housing is not fixed can give rise to further welfare losses 
associated to bubbles in housing (Glaeser, Gyourko, Saiz, 2008). Strong positive house price 
changes signal profitable projects in construction, potentially leading to oversupply. An 
example are ghost cities in Spain. Following Spain’s housing bubble in the years before 2007, 
construction overshot housing demand, leading to unoccupied and unused housing. 
Fourth, besides a loss for investors buying the asset at a bubble price and selling after the bust, 
in housing, the social side is important to be considered as well. A strong increase in the price 
for housing means that the basic need for shelter becomes less affordable. 
Studying the Portuguese housing market and examining a possible bubble is attractive as 
country specific empirical literature on housing bubbles (except for the U.S.) is less extensive. 
After the sovereign debt crisis, roughly ending in 2014, Portuguese house prices experienced a 
strong growth up until present. Several public press publications call for a Portuguese real estate 
or housing bubble. In the Portuguese case, the above-mentioned affordability aspect of house 
price growth appears to be prominent. 
The objective of this paper is to answer the following questions: Do Portuguese house prices 
deviate from their fundamental determinants? Do bank evaluations at the local level present 
bubble-like developments and are they contagious? The two questions are related in the sense 
that housing markets are driven by local determinants. Therefore, a local level analysis can give 
insights on the origins of a nationwide bubble and if bubbles do migrate. The usage of bank 
evaluation data at the disaggregate level helps to shed more light on the above-mentioned 
channel for a bubble’s impact on bank risk. 
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This work contributes to existing literature in several aspects. Firstly, using quantile regressions 
to assess a possible divergence between house prices and their fundamental value in Portugal, 
current exuberance (starting from 2017 Quarter 4 onwards) is found as house price growth 
persists. Secondly, using disaggregate bank evaluation data for 24 Portuguese municipalities, 
recursively estimated right tailed Dickey-Fuller tests are used to detect bubble behaviour. The 
evidence reflects the aggregate picture of current exuberance. Thirdly, possible contagious 
effects of local level bubbles in Portugal are examined. Based on a time varying contagion 
coefficient, proposed by Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016), this work provides evidence 
that the bubbles in Lisbon and Porto may have been contagious for their surrounding areas. 
Especially the local level analysis and the analysis of contagion contribute to research on 
Portugal specific literature. 
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly talks about related 
literature on housing bubbles and bubble contagion, section 3 and 4 describe the methodologies 
and the data used, section 5 analyses the Portuguese housing market and provides results and 
discussion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Housing Bubbles - Related Literature 
Literature on housing bubbles is extensive. In the following review, the focus lies on rational 
bubbles in housing and on bubble contagion. Works that incorporate well plausible special 
features of the housing market will not be discussed in detail (see e.g. Head, Lloyd-Ellis and 
Sun, 2013 for a search model, for the role of easy credit see e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2009, Stein, 
1995, Glaeser and Nathanson, 2014 and for the role of housing supply and construction costs, 
see e.g. Poterba, 1984, Glaeser et al., 2008). Neither presented in detail are models departing 
from the assumption of rationality (see e.g. Case and Shiller (2003) for evidence of optimistic 
expectations, further see Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Guren (2014) for models with limited 
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rationality). For a study, explicitly examining the Portuguese housing market and its drivers 
after 2007, see e.g. Lourenço and Rodrigues (2017). 
 
2.1. Rational Speculative Bubbles in Housing 
Following Cuthbertson (1996), a model with risk neutral, homogeneous agents, rational 
expectations, informational efficiency (no information asymmetries) and a required constant 
real rate of return 𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑟 is assumed. 
In this model, the price of a house is given by the Euler Equation 
 𝑃𝑡 =  𝛿(𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+1) (1) 
with 𝛿 = 1/(1 + 𝑟). 𝐸𝑡 is the expectations operator, 𝑃𝑡 is the house price in period 𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡 is 
the rent generated by the house in period 𝑡. 
With the assumption of rational expectations, (1) can be solved by forward substitution,  
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
= ∑ 𝛿𝑖∞𝑖=1 𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+𝑖. (2) 
Assuming the transversality condition 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑖→∞
𝛿𝑖 𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+𝑖 = 0, a unique solution and therefore a 
unique fundamental house price can be found, 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
.  
In their essence, user cost models (such as Poterba, 1984, 1992 or Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002) 
are similar to (2) with 𝐷𝑡 generally denoting the benefits of owning a house (Glaeser and 
Nathanson, 2014). When trying to measure the benefits of owning a home, 𝐷𝑡 is usually 
associated with rental income (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005) or the benefits of living in 
a particular area, such as income possibilities and amenities, (Glaeser, Gyourko and Morales 
and Nathanson, 2014, Head, Lloyd-Ellis and Sun, 2014). 
The mathematical foundation of an asset price bubble is that there is another solution to (1) 
which, apart from the fundamental value, 𝑃𝑡
𝑓







𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+𝑖 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝐵𝑡 (3) 
The properties of 𝐵𝑡 can be restricted to 𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑚 = 𝐵𝑡/𝛿
𝑚 (see appendix A for an intuitive 
demonstration). This restricts the bubble’s behaviour over time to a martingale, meaning that 
the existence of a bubble term in the house price equation still satisfies the efficient market 
hypothesis. For 𝐵𝑡 ≠ 0 the Euler equation is satisfied but the transversality condition is not, 
because the bubble term is arbitrary.  
The basic model can be extended by making the bubble stochastic; see e.g. Evans (1991) for 
strictly positive bubbles that grow with a certain probability each period and almost surely 
collapse over time. Addressing the exogeneity of the bubble models, following Froot and 
Obstfeld (1991), authors create a link between rental income and the bubble term. For example, 
Nneji, Brooks and Ward, (2013) find evidence of these intrinsic bubbles in the U.S. before 
2000. For a more complete overview of different bubble models and how they might be tested 
econometrically, see e.g. Gürkaynak (2008). 
 
2.2. Bubble Contagion and Bubble Spillovers in Housing 
Looking at the contagion between bubbles, one might loosely formulate the situation as a 
migration of a bubble from one market to another (Gomez-Gonzalez et al. 2017, Deng et al. 
2017).  
Teng, Chang and Chen (2017) employ a state space model on data from the Taipei city centre 
and suburbs, finding a diffusion of bubble prices from the centre to suburbs. After diffusion, 
bubbles in suburbs are found to be larger than in the centre. DeFusco et al. (2012) finds that 
contagion in the US market played a role during the years before 2007, while not finding 
evidence for contagion in the burst after 2007. 
 8 
 
Martinez-Garcia and Grossmann (2018) model how risk spread shocks can cause exuberance 
in house prices even in the absence of a bubble term in the house price equation. In their 
framework, the channel through which shocks in financial markets are spilled over to the 
housing market is a time varying discount factor in the house price equation, equation (3). Using 
logit and probit models, they provide evidence that financial market spillovers can cause 
explosive behaviour in house prices. This contrasts with purely speculative rational bubbles and 
confirms the implications of their stylized model. 
Analysing contagious bubble behaviour between national housing markets, Greenaway-
Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016) look at house prices in New Zealand metropolitan areas. To 
examine the timing of bubble behaviour in metropolitan areas, the study develops a time 
varying contagion coefficient (the methodology is described further in section 3.3.). The authors 
find evidence for Auckland city centre leading the bubble phase and being contagious for its 
metropolitan area as well as for further metropolitan areas in the country. 
Two other works use the method of Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016) to explain 
financial market spillovers to housing markets. Hu and Oxley (2018) used the contagion 
coefficient to provide evidence that in Japan, the 1980-1990 asset bubble migrated to the 
housing market. Deng et al. (2017) concludes that there is evidence that the asset price bubble 
in China migrated to the housing market between 2005 and 2010. 
Gomez-Gonzalez et al. (2017) use the Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016) contagion 
coefficient considering 20 OECD countries. They find evidence for the US bubble being 







3.1. Multivariate approach to detect exuberance - Quantile Regression 
As ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used to estimate the conditional mean of a 
variable, quantile regressions (QR) are used to estimate conditional quantiles of the variable of 
interest. QR, first developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), capture different impacts of 
predictors depending on the point in the distribution of the dependent variable. 
The framework to describe asset price exuberance based on QR was implemented by Machado 
and Sousa (2006). In their case, stock price developments are analysed conditional on a set of 
macroeconomic variables. Gerdesmeier, Lenarčič and Roffia (2012) and Lourenço and 
Rodrigues (2015) apply the method to house prices in OECD countries. In the QR framework, 
exuberant behaviour is evident when the observed asset price moves in the upper tail of the 
modelled distribution of the predicted asset price, conditional on the set of regressors (Machado 
and Sousa, 2006). Furthermore, following the authors’ arguments, exuberance can only be 
determined, if there is an estimate of what exuberant house prices are. The measure for 
extraordinary high prices should be conditional on the macroeconomic environment, instead of 
the past behaviour of house prices. Gerdesmeier, Lenarčič and Roffia (2012) mention that 
especially phases of boom (bubble/exuberance) and bust are known to be non-linear which can 
be captured in the QR framework. 
In practice, one might estimate QR at the median, a high quantile and a low quantile of house 
prices conditional on some fundamental variables. The high and low QR predictions can be 
interpreted as an upper and lower bound, determining the tails of the distribution. When the 
observed house price moves into these tails, exuberant/bubble behaviour or undervaluation can 




3.2. Univariate testing for Bubble behaviour 
To detect bubble behaviour in a time series, Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a, b) develop the General 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (GSADF).The aim of the GSADF is to test episodes of mildly 
explosive behaviour in a time series. Mildly explosive behaviour is defined by Phillips and 
Magdalinos (2007a) as  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 , 𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎
2) in which 𝛿𝑡 = 1 +
𝑐
𝑇𝛼
, 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑇 is the sample size. 
When 𝑐 > 0 the root is explosive and approaches unity (random walk) as 𝑇 →  ∞.  
The GSADF for testing mildly explosive behaviour uses recursively estimated right tailed 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests. Normalizing the sample on the interval [0,1], 𝑟1, 𝑟2 are 
defined as the start and end of the subsample being tested such that 0 ≤  𝑟1  <  𝑟2  ≤  1. The 
null hypothesis of a unit root versus the alternative hypothesis of a mildly explosive root is 
tested with the following recursive regression: 




𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜖𝑡 , 𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝑟1,𝑟2
2 ) (4) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the time series of interest, Δ is the first difference operator, 𝑎𝑟1,𝑟2 is the intercept, 
𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2 is the autoregressive coefficient, 𝜓𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑗
 for 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘 are the coefficients of the lagged 
first differences denoted as Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑗, for 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘. 𝜖𝑡 is an 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 error term with zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝑟1,𝑟2
2 . The subscripts 𝑟1, 𝑟2 are the subsample start and end points respectively for 
which the regression is estimated.  
Using 𝑟1 = 0 and 𝑟2 = 1 gives the right tailed ADF test on the full sample. Using the right tailed 
ADF on the full sample to detect bubbles, the power is harmed by collapsing bubbles (i.e. the 
bubble does not only build up in the sample but also collapses). The test for the whole sample 
might therefore not detect the bubble even though bubble behaviour is present in one or more 
subsamples of the time series. Addressing this issue, Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) use a recursive 
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estimation of the ADF, beginning with the smallest feasible window, starting from 𝑟1 = 0. 
Keeping the starting point fixed, the ADF is performed with 𝑟2 increasing one observation at a 
time, until 𝑟2 = 1. Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) then define the test statistic, Sup ADF (SADF) 
as the supremum value of the set of ADF test statistics yielded by the recursive estimation. The 
test is more powerful in detecting mildly explosive behaviour than the ADF over the full sample 
if a bubble not only builds up in the sample but also collapses within the sample, (Homm and 
Breitung, 2012). 
Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a & b) show that the SADF is less powerful in case multiple 
periodically collapsing bubbles exist in the sample and introduce the General Sup ADF 
(GSADF). The test uses the expanding window structure of the SADF while not keeping 𝑟1 =
0 fixed but allowing 𝑟1 to be flexible. This leads to a set of ADF tests for all feasible subsamples. 
For the test statistic and limit distribution of the GSADF test see Appendix B. 
The way in which the GSADF is constructed, makes it more powerful for samples with 
reoccurring and collapsing bubbles than the ADF over the whole sample or the SADF over the 
forward expanding window.  
 
3.3. Measuring Bubble Contagion  
As discussed in section 2.2., bubbles might be substance to contagion in the sense that a bubble 
in one market migrates to another. To formally describe this effect over time, Greenaway-
Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016) develop a time varying contagion coefficient. 
In a first step, the method estimates autoregressions similar to equation (4) with a fixed window, 
leading to sequences of autoregressive coefficients, {?̂?𝑖,𝑠}𝑠=𝑆
𝑇
, 𝑖 indexing regions, 𝑆 being the 
length of the fixed window, and 𝑠 being the end of the subsample, 𝑠 = 𝑆, … , 𝑇. The 
autoregressive coefficients are obtained by ordinary least squares.  
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With the estimated sequences, the following regression is estimated 
 ?̂?𝑗,𝑠 = 𝛿1𝑗 + 𝛿2𝑗 (
𝑠
𝑇 − 𝑆 + 1
) ?̂?𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑠−𝑑 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑠 = 𝑆,… , 𝑇 (5) 
where 𝑗 denotes some region and 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 denotes the potential contagious region from which a 
bubble spreads. 𝑑 is a lag parameter for the lagged contagion effect from 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 to 𝑗. 𝛿2𝑗 is the 
time varying contagion coefficient. 
The contagion coefficient is estimated by local level kernel regression with 



















) where 𝐾(. ) is the Gaussian Kernel 𝐾(. ) = (2𝜋)−1/2𝑒−1/2(.)
2
and ℎ is the 
bandwidth parameter. For further details, see Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016). 
The framework lets the contagion parameter evolve smoothly over time (see Greenaway-
Mcgrevy and Phillips, 2016). One can track the change in the contagion coefficient during 
bubble periods. The method helps to visualize the shape of the contagious impact over time in 
one region and allows for a comparison between regions. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. Used data series 
Quarterly data for the price to rent ratio, price to income ratio, rent price index, disposable 
income, GDP, private consumption deflator, population, real money market rate, 
unemployment rate, labour force, real mortgage rate, real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
housing are obtained from OECD, Banco de Portugal and European Central Bank. Quarterly 
house prices are also taken from OECD and correspond to hedonic price data of newly built 
and existing dwellings sales (adjusted for quality measures of housing: square meter price, size 
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of dwelling, location of dwelling). Real series are defined as nominal data divided by the private 
consumption deflator. The series span from 1988:Q1–2019:Q3. 
Monthly bank evaluation data (2011:M1–2020:M2) for 24 municipalities was obtained from 
Instituto Nacional de Estatístico (INE), based on the institution’s survey on bank evaluation on 
housing. 
 
4.2. Bank Appraisals vs Market prices 
As bank appraisal data (used interchangeable with bank evaluation) is used in the disaggregate 
analysis due to constraints in the availability of market price data, it is important to have a closer 
look at the differences in appraisals and market prices. Appraisals provide a safety mechanism 
for banks, as the minimum of the appraisal value and the purchase price is pledged as collateral. 
The value pledged as collateral is also used for the calculation of the Loan-to-Value (LTV) as 
a key metric for risk measurement in lending. In case of bubbles, LTVs are biased downwards, 
skewing banks risk profiles.  
Figure 1: Bank Appraisals vs. Market Prices 
 
Y Axis is in €/m², light colours are market prices (P), median dwelling sales in €/m²,  










2011:1 2013:1 2015:1 2017:1 2019:1
LisboaBE CascaisBE BragaBE PortoBE
LisboaP CascaisP BragaP PortoP
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Nakamura (2010) argues that appraisals are systematically upward biased (above the market 
price), due to a conflict of interest as banks hire the appraiser. 
Figure 1 plots average bank evaluations against median sales values for some important 
Portuguese housing markets. For Lisbon, average appraisals are substantially smaller than 
median sales prices towards the end of the series. The picture for Cascais is similar but less 
strong. This might be explained by banks’ precautionary behaviour towards the strong increase 
in market prices. For Braga, appraisals are above market prices throughout the series. Similarly, 
appraisals for Porto are higher than market prices but come closer together towards the end.  
To thoroughly examine appraisal bias, micro data shall be considered such as in Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1996). 
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1. Aggregate Analysis: Exuberance 
To analyse Portuguese house prices at the aggregate level, it is opted for the quantile regression 
approach, described in section 3.1. The literature on determinants for house prices in the long 
run is extensive (as partly described in section 2.). Looking at the demand side of housing, 
typical fundamental variables used include: Economic activity, income, demographic variables 
such as population or labour force, employment, mortgage rate and other interest rates and the 
development of substitutive investments (e.g. stock market returns). Usually housing supply is 
considered to be fixed in the short run but flexible in the long run. Supply side variables include 
building permits, construction costs, and GFCF housing (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008).  
Given the length of the sample and available data the model is chosen as follows. To capture a 
main driver of housing demand, disposable income per capita is included. If income rises, 
housing becomes more affordable and thus, demand for housing will rise, pushing prices 
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upwards. The second variable included, is a three-month money market rate, capturing effects 
of the availability of credit to finance housing (by affecting the mortgage rate for households 
and borrowing rates for institutional real estate investors). To capture demographic effects that 
influence housing demand, the labour force is included as well. 
As we are looking at long run relationships, the supply of housing is included. GFCF housing 
is used as supply variable. The variable captures investment in housing, providing a good proxy 
for the change in housing supply. Thus, when GFCF rises, the supply of housing shall rise, 
putting downward pressure on house prices.  
The model is given by,  
𝑟𝐻𝑃𝑡(𝜏|𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝛼1(𝜏)𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝜏)𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3(𝜏)𝑟𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼4(𝜏)𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 (6) 
where 𝑟𝐻𝑃𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the real house price index in period 𝑡, 𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of real disposable income per capita in period 𝑡, 𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 corresponds to a real 3 month 
money market rate in period 𝑡, 𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the GFCF housing in period 𝑡 
and 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 is the natural logarithm of labour force in period 𝑡. 𝜏 is the quantile for which the 
model is estimated. 
As the variables used in (6) are nonstationary (confirmed by unit root tests), it has to be tested 
for quantile cointegration. Following Xiao (2009), testing quantile cointegration by performing 
a cusum test on the residuals of (6), the null of cointegration cannot be rejected (1.7470 for 𝜏 =
0.3, 0.5950 for 𝜏 = 0.5, 1.6380 for 𝜏 = 0.7, smaller than the critical value 1.82). 0.3, 0.5 and 
0.7 are used for the quantile cointegration test as the cusum type test can get too sensitive 
towards the tails of the distribution that contain less information. See Appendix C for specifics 
of the quantile cointegration test and previously conducted unit root tests. Thus (6) can be seen 
as a quantile specific long run relationship. 
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Figure 2 is showing the estimation results of the model, plotting the predicted 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 
quantiles and the natural logarithm of the observed real house price index over time. 0.2 and 
0.8 are chosen as limits due to the length of data. One can see that the estimated quantiles, 
together, can explain a lot of the variation in real house prices as the observed house prices are 
between the estimated 0.2 and 0.8 quantiles for most of the period. Towards the end of the 
series, more or less from 2016:Q2 onwards, house prices grow faster than the estimated 
quantiles.  
 
Figure 2: House prices and estimated fundamental quantiles 
 
Y Axis denotes natural logarithm of real house prices. predicted quantiles and observed 
house prices are plotted, blue is the 0.2 quantile, green is the median, red is the 0.8 quantile, 
black is the observed series. The dashed orange line marks the start of current exuberant 
behaviour.  
Source: OECD, ECB, Banco de Portugal and author’s calculations. 
 
The persistence in faster growth leads to observed house prices moving further in the upper tail 
of the estimated distribution. In 2017:Q4 house prices cross the 0.8 quantile, marked by the 
dashed orange line. Given the threshold, house prices are considered exuberant from 2017:Q4. 
The result clearly is conditional on the chosen macroeconomic fundamentals. Different model 











1988:1 1994:1 2000:1 2006:1 2012:1 2018:1
Q 0.2 Q 0.5 Q 0.8 rHP
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rents) and are reported in Appendix D. The qualitative result, that house prices are exuberant in 
the end of the series does hold for these specifications. Still, factors remain, that might drive 
house prices above the fundamental benchmark set by macroeconomic variables (such as 
investment in tourism accommodation, foreign direct investment, regulations and other 
observed or unobserved economic variables, section 5.4. will further discuss this issue). 
 
5.2. Disaggregate Analysis: Bubble behaviour 
Housing markets are known to be highly affected by local level variables. The price of housing 
in Lisbon is likely to move differently from the price of housing in Leiria. Thus, detecting 
exuberant behaviour when treating Portugal as one housing market, local differences are 
interesting to explore. 
To capture these differences, we use bank appraisal data for 24 Portuguese, mainly urban, 
municipalities from January 2011 to February 2020. Due to a lack of time series for 
determinants at the local level, we apply the univariate GSADF test for mildly explosive 
behaviour (in this part used interchangeably with bubble behaviour), described in section 3.2., 
to the series. The test is consistent with the rational bubble introduced in section 2.1., as the 
martingale characteristics of asset price bubbles are captured (Greenaway-Mcgrevy and 
Phillips, 2016). A drawback, when using the univariate approach is, that explosive behaviour 
in the series can be caused by explosiveness in the underlying determinants (discussed in section 
5.4.). When considering a model of rational asset price bubbles with a constant discount factor, 
the determinant is expected rental income. Sustained explosive growth in expected rental 
income would mean periods of consecutive good news of which each information is better than 
the previous news which might lack credibility (Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips, 2016). The 
test is conservative in the sense that prolonged but not explosive growth of prices will not 
qualify as a bubble.  
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The GSADF test was performed with an initial window of 24 month and using three lags, 
supported by the Bayesian Information Criterion. Critical values are derived by Monte Carlo 
simulation. The test results are reported in table 1.  
 
Table 1: GSADF Test Results for Bank Evaluation Data for Portuguese Municipalities 
 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. All results are for 3 
autoregressive lags. Critical values are obtained by Monte Carlo Simulation. 
Source: INE and author’s calculations. 
 
We notice that evidence for bubble behaviour is found in close to all regions under analysis, 
solely for Santa Maria da Feira, the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected in favour of the 
presence of mildly explosive behaviour in the sample.  
To get a more systematic picture of the occurring episodes of bubble behaviour, figure 3 plots 
the timely course of bubble episodes in the 24 municipalities at usual confidence levels. 
At first sight, bubble behaviour seems to be correlated across municipalities. Before 2016, 
evidence for bubble behaviour is rather sporadic in the sample. Beginning in mid-2016, first 
evidence for the subsequently prolonged and widespread bubble behaviour is recorded for 
Lisbon at the 10% level. By December 2016, Lisbon, Cascais, Loures, Porto and Oeiras show 
evidence for bubble behaviour at the 5% level, Sintra at the 1% level. Moving in time, bubble 
behaviour is detected across more cities, in December 2017, 11 of the 24 cities under 
GSADF Test Statistics
Portugal 3.878***
Almada 2.359*** Maia 2.760***
Amadora 2.882*** Matosinhos 4.084***
Barcelos 1.620** Odivelas 2.316***
Braga 2.270*** Oeiras 1.966**
Cascais 3.026*** Porto 2.295***
Coimbra 2.103** Santa Maria da Feira 0.995
Funchal 1.907** Seixal 2.802***
Gondomar 3.647*** Setúbal 2.192***
Guimarães 2.110** Sintra 4.574***
Leiria 1.926** Vila Franca de Xira 2.174**
Lisboa 2.723*** Vila Nova de Famalicão 3.023***
Loures 2.655*** Vila Nova de Gaia 3.248***
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consideration are evident for bubbles at the 5% level. Towards the end of the sample, the highest 
numbers of bubbles are detected (18 out of 24 municipalities). 
 
Figure 3: Evidence for bubbles in Portuguese municipalities against time  
 
Areas represent the rejection of the null of the GSADF test in favour of mildly explosive behaviour at the 10% 
(light grey), 5% (grey) and 1% (black) confidence level. The dashed orange line indicates the start of exuberant 
behaviour found in 5.1. 
Source: INE and author’s calculations. 
 
This is in accordance with the aggregate analysis in section 5.1., in which exuberant behaviour 
is detected starting in 2017:Q4, represented by the dashed orange line in figure 3. Interestingly, 
despite Lisbon leading the bubble cycle, the Lisbon bubble seems to have ended in July 2019. 
Also, the bubble in Porto is not evident towards the end of the considered period (November 
2019), while there is strong evidence for bubble behaviour in a wide range of municipalities. It 
has to be recalled that bank evaluations are used for this analysis and do differ from market 
prices, as in section 4.2. Thus, some results in figure 3 might reflect banks’ precautionary 
























Vila Franca de Xira
Vila Nova de Famalicão




5.3. Bubble Contagion 
The results of the previous section point towards possible bubble contagion as bubbles are 
correlated and some municipalities present bubble behaviour earlier than others. To analyse 
bubble contagion, the contagion coefficient proposed by Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016) and 
presented in section 3.3. is used. The contagious response before, during and after bubble 
periods is tracked. 
Lisbon and Porto are chosen as core markets because the two municipalities present the centres 
of the country’s largest metropolitan areas. In case of Lisbon, the bubble also starts earlier than 
in any other municipality. The lag order for municipality 𝑗 possibly behaving contagious to the 
core bubble is determined by the months between first evidence for bubble behaviour in the 
core and first bubble behaviour in the tested municipality. In case more than 6 months are 
between the initiation of bubbles, it is opted for 6 lags. For Lisbon as a core market, Almada, 
Amadora, Cascais, Loures, Odivelas, Oeiras, Seixal, Setubal, Sintra and Vila Franca da Xira 
were tested towards possible contagious reactions due to their geographic proximity. 
Regression (5) was estimated using local level kernel regression with local constant fitting. To 
estimate the autoregressive coefficients for the regression, a fixed window of 24 months was 
used. Results are presented for municipalities with strongest responses in figure 4. 
The contagion coefficients for Sintra, Vila Franca de Xira and Seixal present an inverted U 
shape. The contagious effect from Lisbon to Sintra and Vila Franca de Xira builds up before 
the bubble in Lisbon is evident and are at the maximum at the start of Lisbon’s bubble period 
(Vila Franca de Xira) and 4 months before (Sintra). The contagious effect decreases during the 
bubble period before becoming adverse around April 2018. The contagious behaviour for Seixal 
becomes positive 4 months before Lisbon’s bubble period. It reaches a maximum roughly one 
year after the start of Lisbon’s bubble and decreases to zero one month after the Lisbon bubble 
ends. The contagious response for Almada becomes positive about one month before the Lisbon 
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bubble, responses for Amadora and Odivelas become positive about 7 months after the initiation 
of the Lisbon bubble. 
Figure 4: Time varying contagion coefficient from Lisbon housing market for other 
municipalities in geographic proximity 
 
The shaded area indicates the Lisbon bubble period evident in section 5.2. Lines are the 
plotted time varying contagion coefficients 𝛿2𝑗 for the respective municipalities. 
Source: INE and author’s calculations. 
 
In a similar way, Porto is analysed as a core region having a contagious impact on its 
surrounding municipalities, displayed in figure 5. All municipalities present some sort of S 
shape in their responses. Effects for Gondomar, Matosinhos and Vila Nova de Famalicão 
become positive before the Porto bubble and are rather flat during the Bubble Period. Braga 
and Guimarães both turn positive roughly 2 months before the Porto bubble and increase during 
the bubble period. It shall be noted that the Porto bubble does not lead the bubble periods for 
Gondomar, Matosinhos and Vila Nova de Famalicão, thus for these municipalities the response 
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Figure 5: Time varying contagion coefficient from Porto housing market for other 
municipalities in geographic proximity 
 
The shaded area indicates the Porto bubble period evident in 5.2. Lines are the plotted time 
varying contagion coefficients 𝛿2𝑗 for the respective municipalities. 
Source: INE and author’s calculations. 
 
In general, the results indicate bubble contagion because responses are positive during bubble 
periods. Nevertheless, the results are rather descriptive, tracking how the municipalities’ 
autoregressive coefficients are related to the respective core market autoregressive coefficients 
in time, through the kernel regression specification. To better explain bubble contagion and 
commonalities and differences in response functions above, further possible driver variables on 
the local level would need to be included. 
 
5.4. Discussion  
As previously mentioned, the detected exuberance in section 5.1. and the detected bubble 
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behaviour (as in 2.). In this section, we discuss different drivers for house prices, that were not 
possible to include in formal methods. 
Common variables considered in the literature are income and rent, capturing affordability, the 
choice between renting and buying and the return on housing investment. As can be seen in 
figure 6, the price to rent and price to income ratios are rising similarly to house prices from 
roughly 2014. Thus, at the aggregate level, it seems that a rather small part of the increase in 
real house prices can be explained by rising income or rising rents (also confirmed by model 3 
in appendix D, shown in Figure D.3 in which exuberance is evident despite including income 
and rent data). 
Figure 6: Real house prices, price-to-rent and price-to-income ratio for Portugal 
 
Plotted are the natural logarithms of real house price index(rHP) and natural logarithms 
of Price-to-rent ratio (P/R) and Price-to-income ratio (P/I), 2015=100. 
Source: OECD. 
 
Apart from the demand variables mentioned in section 5.1., an important driver can be tourism 
and investment in tourism accommodation, especially in the Portuguese case. Due to online 
platforms fostering access to clients and management for short-term rental, housing investments 
to accommodate tourists became more attractive for a wider range of investors. This not only 
increases demand on the housing market, but also willingness to pay from an investment point 
















higher return than permanent letting to the local population. The tie between local income and 
return on housing is cut in this case. The argument can be supported to some extent by the 
explosive growth in the number of firms that are associated to “furnished accommodation for 
tourists” from 2013 and 2014 onwards, see table 2. The data ends before the detected 
exuberance and bubble behaviour but it does give a hint towards the importance of investment 
in tourism accommodation.  
 
Table 2: Number of Firms associated to furnished short-stay accommodation for 
tourists 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, IES. 
 
Further arguments on drivers for house prices include foreign direct investment in housing. 
Following the Golden Residence Permit Programme, introduced in October 2012, foreign direct 
investment in housing likely accelerated. The regulation allows residence after investing more 
than 500.000€ in property. The number of resident permits given increased from 464 in 2013 
to 1526 in 2014. In 2018 the number was 1332 and in 2019 1160 (Serviço de Estrangeiros e 
Fronteiras, 2020).  
Another argument that can be thought of is taste. Portugal and Lisbon won several awards, e.g. 
Portugal as “World’s Leading Destination” in 2018 and 2019 and Lisbon as “World’s Leading 
City Destination 2018” (World Travel awards, 2020). This might cause broad based attraction 
for people choosing Portugal as their home for a medium period of time (such as exchange 
students and remote workers that are not captured in migration or labour force statistics). 
Options for medium term rentals to this group of people again offer higher returns on housing 
investment.  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Shortstay accomodation 2112 2578 2,784 2,990 3,333 5,228 11,917 17,196
Furnished accomodation for tourists 340 504 572 665 906 2,374 8,303 13,122
Other shortstay accomodation 1772 2074 2,212 2,325 2,427 2,854 3,614 4,074
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These factors present further demand for housing. Housing supply is only growing slowly, from 
2014 after a prolonged decline, leaving upward pressure on prices (see figure 6). 
Figure 7: Housing supply 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, INE. 
 
Together, the presented arguments can explain at least some of the detected exuberant and 
bubble behaviour. Due to data restrictions it is not possible to quantify the impact. Further 
disaggregate data would be crucial to explain local differences in bubble behaviour. However, 
it seems the arguments leave space for rational speculation as a possible explanation.  
Why can housing bubbles be contagious? The channels for contagion cannot be explored in 
detail in this work but a narrative for the findings is still interesting to provide. The reason for 
contagion might be, that when speculation begins in one place, say Lisbon, prices start to 
increase rapidly, leading first investors to search for alternatives and invest in other property 
markets, where they expect the next housing bubble. Prices start to rise in these regions, 
attracting more investors and might create bubble behaviour. Geographic proximity is an 
important channel, since bubble behaviour in centres is likely to push people to the suburbs, 
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analysed after the occurrence, a general prediction for bubble contagion patterns goes against 
the fundamental rule that bubbles cannot be predicted (martingale behaviour).  
 
5.5. Policy Implications 
On a general level, the presented analysis points towards policies addressing housing bubbles 
that are present in bank evaluations in many Portuguese municipalities. Further, the presented 
evidence for bubble contagion indicates quick and direct response for inflationary bubbles in 
one region, since otherwise the inflating bubble might well be contagious causing bubbles in 
more regions. 
When it comes to concrete measures regarding bubbles, economic literature does not provide a 
defined toolbox to address the problem. 
In the case of housing, authors call for the supply side. The argument is that if supply can adjust 
quicker because of e.g. less bureaucracy in building permits, housing bubbles will not be as 
strong. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) point towards possible welfare losses due to 
overbuilding during housing bubbles. 
Given the evidence of bubble behaviour in bank evaluations, one feasible suggestion is a more 
prudent property valuation, such that current LTV’s will better reflect bank’s risk. To restrict 
lending, the down payment requirement could be adjusted, such that LTV is advised to be less 
than currently 0.9. Another option to restrict lending is higher required equity for banks. A 
deterioration of LTVs based on bubble valuations can itself cause defaults by causing higher 
interest payments for borrowers, underlining the importance of adequately valued LTVs. 
Further, policies regarding home ownership should take into account that the asset that many 
households take on a lot of debt for, does present bubble behaviour. The large amounts of credit 
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backed by an asset which value and valuation (bank evaluation) is substance to bubble 
behaviour has to be considered and communicated as a risk. 
The lack of further suitable policy answers to bubbles and discussions that usually focus on 




The paper presents an analysis of Portuguese house price behaviour. For the aggregate data we 
conduct a quantile regression analysis. Conditional on the chosen macroeconomic determinants 
the results indicate exuberant behaviour starting in 2017:Q4.  
To get a better picture of the exuberant behaviour detected at the aggregate level we turned to 
disaggregate data on bank evaluations of 24 Portuguese municipalities. To detect local level 
bubble behaviour in bank evaluations, the General Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
of Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a & b) is used. Broad based bubble behaviour is evident. Timely 
differences in the bubble development can be noticed. To explore the question if the bubbles in 
Lisbon and Porto were contagious for their surrounding municipalities, we use the contagion 
coefficient proposed by Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Phillips (2016). The results indicate that 
Lisbon and Porto seem to have a contagious effect on surrounding housing markets.  
Clearly, exuberant behaviour in prices can be caused by a range of reasons apart from 
speculative bubbles. Together, local and foreign investment associated to tourism 
accommodation, foreign direct investment and shifts in taste can explain some but supposedly 
not all explosiveness/exuberance in Portuguese house prices.  
Bubble behaviour in bank evaluations for housing has strong implications for banks’ risk. 
LTV’s can be biased downward causing a too high volume in credit and a skewed risk profile. 
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A bust of the housing bubble could as well cause defaults by rising mortgage payments as they 
are based on LTV.  
Policy implications shall address the current bubbles detected in bank evaluations and take into 
account that bubbles can be contagious. Banks and appraisers might be advised to value 
property more prudently. 
Future research on Portuguese local level housing markets is important to better understand the 
country’s housing market dynamics (as they are known to be driven locally) even though data 
is less available than in other countries. Future research on how and why appraisals differ from 
market values in Portugal is a further interesting task. Also, a framework to analyse channels 
through which bubbles can be contagious is interesting to research. On a further level, it is 
important to research and improve techniques to detect bubbles and as well to conduct research 
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Appendix A: Restricting Rational Bubbles to a martingale 
Following Cuthbertson (1995) the bubbles behaviour can be restricted by assuming that (3) is 
a solution to (1).  
Leading (3) one period ahead, to time 𝑡 + 1, gives the expression  
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡(𝛿𝐸𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+2 + 𝛿
2𝐸𝑡+2𝐷𝑡+3 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑡+1), 
And using the law of iterated expectations, 𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+𝑗)= 𝐸𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+𝑗,  
the expression becomes: 
 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1 = (𝛿𝐸𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+2 + 𝛿
2𝐸𝑡+2𝐷𝑡+3 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑡+1). (A.1). 
Equation (1) contains 𝛿(𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+1). Using (A.1), it is given by 
𝛿(𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1) = 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+1 + (𝛿𝐸𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+2 + 𝛿
2𝐸𝑡+2𝐷𝑡+3 +⋯+ 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+1) and  
using the definition of 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
 one arrives at 𝛿(𝐸𝑡𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1) = 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+1. 
Using (1), the left-hand side becomes 𝑃𝑡 and one arrives at  
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+1 (A.2) 
Since (3) and (A.2) are only both solutions to (1), if equated, leading to 
 𝐵𝑡 = 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+1 or 𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡/𝛿 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡 (A.3) 
If (a3) holds, (3) and (A.2) are the same and both satisfy (1).  
More generally (A.3) provides with 𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑚 = 𝐵𝑡/𝛿
𝑚. 
This restricts the bubble’s behaviour over time to a martingale, meaning that the best forecast 




Appendix B: General Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller test (GSADF) 
The GSADF test statistic is given by 







in which 𝑟0 is the smallest feasible window chosen. Under the null hypothesis, the limit 



























where 𝑊 is a standard Wiener process and 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 is the size of the window. 
If 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) is larger than the critical value from the limit distribution, the null hypothesis of 
a unit root is rejected against the alternative hypothesis of mildly explosive behaviour. 
 
Appendix C: Quantile cointegration  
To interpret (6) as a long run relationship for each quantile, after confirming nonstationarity, it 
needs to be tested for quantile cointegration.  
Following Xiao (2009), quantile cointegration can be tested as follows. Looking at 𝜓𝜏(𝑢) =
𝜏 − 𝐼(𝑢 < 0) and the residual from the estimated quantile regression:  
𝑡𝜏 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑄𝑦𝑡(𝜏|ℱ𝑡) = 𝑦𝑡 − Θ(𝜏)
′𝑍𝑡 = 𝑡 − 𝐹𝜀
−1(𝜏), one has 𝑄𝜀𝑡𝜏(𝜏) = 0, where 𝑄𝜀𝑡𝜏(𝜏) is 
the 𝜏-th quantile of 𝑡𝜏 and 𝐸𝜓𝜏( 𝑡𝜏) = 0. Xiao (2009) proposes to test for cointegration by 









𝑗=1 𝑗𝜏), where 𝜔𝜓
∗ 2denotes the long run variance of 𝜓𝜏( 𝑗𝜏), under 
appropriate assumptions, that process follows an invariance principle and weakly converges to 
a standard Brownian motion 𝑊(𝑟). Choosing a continuous functional ℎ(. ) measuring the 
fluctuation of 𝑌𝑛(𝑟), a robust test for cointegration can be examined using ℎ(𝑌𝑛(𝑟)). With the 
continuous mapping theorem and under regularity conditions and the null hypothesis of 
cointegration ℎ(𝑌𝑛(𝑟)) ⟹ ℎ(𝑊(𝑟)). 
Under the alternative hypothesis, the statistic diverges to ∞. 
If a quantile specific cointegrating relationship is present, the residuals of the quantile 
regression only present fluctuations around a long-term equilibrium, reflected by a stable 
process of 𝑡𝜏. 
Previously conducted unit root tests to confirm non-stationarity of the variables in (6) are 
presented in table C.1. 
Table C.1: Test results of ADFGLS and Phillips Perron  
 
𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐, 𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓, 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 are defined as in 5.1. 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 corresponds to the logarithm of real GDP 
per capita, 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑡𝑖 is the real mortgage rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the logarithm of real rent index and 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 is 
the unemployment rate. The ADFGLS test uses the Perron-Qu method and it is tested down from 12 












Confidence level 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
Critical values -2.64 -2.93 -3.46 Z(t) -3.14 -3.44 -4.03

























including a trend for 𝑟𝐻𝑃 is 0.229 and the critical values for the Phillips Perron test when not 
including a trend are -2.578, 2.888 and -3.501 for the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively).  
As the null of a unit root is not rejected for all series (except for 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 at the 10% level using 
Phillips Perron Z(t)), the series are nonstationary and qualify for testing quantile cointegration.  
Source: OECD, ECB, Banco de Portugal and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Appendix D: Additional figures for the different quantile regression specifications 
To check the robustness of the model in 5.1, following four models were considered as well, 
shown in table D. 
Table D: Further Model Specifications for exuberance analysis 
 
𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐, 𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓, 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 are defined as in 5.1. 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 corresponds to the logarithm of real GDP 
per capita, 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑡𝑖 is the real mortgage rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the logarithm of real rent index and 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 is 
the unemployment rate. 
 









1 rgdpc rmmi rgfcf labour
2 rdic rmrti rgfcf labour
3 rdic rmmi rgfcf rrent




Figure D.1: Estimation Results for Model 1 
 
Source: OECD, ECB, Banco de Portugal and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure D.2: Estimation Results for Model 2 
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Figure D.3: Estimation Results for Model 3 
 
Source: OECD, ECB, Banco de Portugal and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure D.4: Estimation Results for Model 4 
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